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By midday on July 1st, 1863, what had begun as a small skirmish in the farmland north 
of Gettysburg had escalated into a full-blown conflict. Around noon on July 1st, the leading 
division of the Union army’s Eleventh Corps, a predominantly German-American force 
commanded by Oliver Howard, arrived at the field. Despite being exhausted from marching at a 
double-quick pace to reach the battlefield, the men of the Eleventh Corps were assigned a critical 
yet daunting task. In an effort to buy time for the rest of the Army of the Potomac to arrive and, 
more importantly, to prevent Confederate forces from occupying the favorable defensive terrain 
just south of Gettysburg, two divisions of the Eleventh corps were tasked with repulsing 
Confederate assaults from the north, with a third division positioned directly south in support, on 
Cemetery Hill.1  
The two divisions, commanded by Brigadier Generals Alexander Schimmelfennig and 
Francis Barlow, positioned themselves in the farm valley to the north of town. With the majority 
of the Army of the Potomac still several hours of marching away from combat, these two 
divisions were the right flank of the Union defense. With the Union First Corps positioned just 
due east along Oak Ridge and McPherson's Ridge, the Eleventh extended from the Mummasburg 
Road for approximately three quarters of a mile northwest, its extreme right flank positioned just 
west of Rock Creek and the Heidlersburg Road.2  
The landscape in the valley was less than ideal for a sustained defensive effort. It was 
largely featureless, consisting of little more than a square mile of flat farmland with little to no 
areas for troops to take cover. Frustrated by the disadvantageous terrain, Barlow advanced his 
division, which stood as the right flank of the entire Union force, onto a small wooded knoll, the 
                                               
1 David L. Valuska and Christian Keller, Damn Dutch: Pennsylvania Germans at Gettysburg (Mechanicsburg, PA: 
Stackpole Books, 2004), 81-91.  
2 Edwin B. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign, A Study in Command ( New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1984), 287-8.  
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only position of measurable elevation in the valley. Despite attempting to justify the movement 
by claiming that he could not let the Confederate attackers occupy the knoll for an artillery 
position, Barlow’s decision to advance his troops further than orders stated proved to be a 
significant strategic blunder. With the majority of his division several hundred yards ahead of the 
rest of the Eleventh Corps’ line, Barlow’s position on the knoll created a salient in the Union line 
that was vulnerable to attack from the north, east, and west.  
By mid-afternoon, Confederate General Jubal Early had begun his assault on the right 
flank of the Union line. Recognizing the vulnerability of the Barlow’s 900 troops positioned on 
the knoll, Brigadier General John Gordon’s Georgian troops spilled across Rock Creek and 
mercilessly assaulted the exposed right flank of Barlow’s division. Despite mounting a fierce 
resistance against superior numbers, the men of the 54th and 68th New York were eventually 
forced to flee their position. In just 20 minutes of fighting, the extreme right flank of the Union 
line had dissolved and collapsed. With Gordon’s men now occupying Barlow’s Knoll to the east 
and Early’s divisions still launching frontal assaults from the north, the remaining Union 
defenders were now enduring Confederate assaults from two fronts. The collapse of the Barlow’s 
Knoll position created a snowball effect that resulted in the Eleventh Corps defenses collapsing 
from right to left, with survivors fleeing in confusion and terror southward through the town. By 
4 o’clock in the afternoon, the Eleventh Corps’ lines had completely dissolved. The fighting had 
been impressively lopsided: In little over an hour, the Eleventh Corps had suffered 
approximately 3,200 casualties, including 1,400 prisoners. Confederate casualties amounted to 
less than 750.3 
Despite the failure of the Eleventh Corps to repulse Early’s assault, the first day of 
fighting at Gettysburg still ended on a somewhat positive note for Union command. Already held 
                                               
3 Stephen W. Sears, Gettysburg (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2003), 212-7.  
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and anchored by a third division of the Eleventh Corps, Cemetery Hill stood as the rallying point 
for the surviving elements of the Eleventh fleeing from the valley below. Despite being criticized 
for keeping the majority of his third division defending Cemetery Hill rather than engaging with 
the enemy near Barlow’s Knoll, Howard recognized the strategic importance of occupying the 
hill. Rising over 100 feet tall, it offered Union forces a fortified, elevated position with a 
commanding view of the battlefield and a perfect location to place artillery batteries. With 
Culp’s Hill rising to the northeast and Cemetery Ridge directly to the south, Cemetery Hill was 
considered the “keystone” of the Union line: its occupation and defense was thus imperative to 
maintaining a strong and uniform defensive position on the ridges and hills south of the town. 
Lastly, Cemetery Hill shielded the Baltimore Pike just east of the hill. Keeping the Baltimore 
Pike clear, secured, and in Union hands ensured that it would remain usable for the Army of the 
Potomac’s extensive supply trains, as well as an emergency route out of the area if necessary. 
While Jubal Early’s defeat of the Eleventh Corps was demoralizing and left many of its units as 
shells of their former selves, the Army of Northern Virginia’s failure to continue their 
momentum from its victories on the first day through overtaking Cemetery Hill ensured that the 
Union forces at Gettysburg would continue to prevent Lee’s forces from occupying the high 
ground south of the town that would prove to be  essential for victory during the next two days.4  
When visiting Cemetery Hill and Barlow’s Knoll in the present day, there is very little 
information presented by the National Park Service that sheds any light on the strategic 
importance of the hill, the ill-advised advance of General Barlow, the bloodshed that occurred on 
and around the hill, nor the impact that the Eleventh Corps’ retreat had on the widespread stigma 
and prejudice surrounding German American soldiers in the Union army. The failure of the 
                                               
4 Harry W. Pfanz, Gettysburg: Culp’s Hill & Cemetery Hill (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 
1993), 25.  
Klustner 5 
National Park Service to fully acknowledge every narrative tied to this landscape inevitably 
results in visitors misunderstanding not only the true story of the fighting that transpired, but also 
its significance for the collective German-American identity in the United States.  
One of the most obvious aspects of the interpretive landscape around Cemetery Hill is the 
absence of nearly any commemoration of the Army of Northern Virginia’s role in the fighting. 
While monuments dedicated to Union commanders and soldiers alike are numerous, there are 
none respectively for their Confederate counterparts. By placing an overt emphasis on Union 
monumentation, the Park Service is subsequently causing visitors to be oblivious of the lopsided 
victory that the Confederates achieved on July 1st, and more importantly of the extensive human 
suffering that occurred in the valley below.  
The absence of Confederate commemoration anywhere around Cemetery Hill, as well as 
the grandeur monuments commemorating Generals Howard and Hancock on the summit results 
in the casual visitor interpreting the site as a symbol of Union military dominance and prestige. 
The position did indeed hold a critically important role in Union strategy for the rest of the battle, 
and Howard’s recognition of the hill’s importance should not go unnoticed. This, however is 
only half the story. The National Park Service fails to mention anywhere on site Cemetery Hill’s 
importance as a rallying point for the retreating men for the Eleventh Corps and ignores the 
strategic misjudgement that led to these men fleeing up the slopes of the hill.  
 Another aspect of the Cemetery Hill landscape that skews the visitor’s interpretation of 
the battle is the manner in which Francis Barlow is memorialized. The monument portrays 
Barlow as a dashing, heroic figure who stands honorably towards an advancing enemy. Nowhere 
does it mention Barlow’s catastrophic decision to advance his own division forward and creating 
a salient in the Union line. Left only with this sole monument to interpret at the site of Barlow’s 
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Knoll and no wayside in proximity, visitors are presented with only one side of Barlow’s story. 
Similar to the grand monuments on the summit of Cemetery Hill, the presence of Barlow’s 
monument, coupled with the absence of any other interpretive markers, allows visitors to ignore 
the fact that Barlow’s strategic error arguably led to the success of the Confederate assaults on 
the first day of combat. Again, no mention is ever made regarding the loss of life that was a 
direct result of Barlow’s decision making, nor his anti-German prejudice that helped contribute 
to the stigma surrounding the Eleventh Corps’ identity as a German-American unit.  
 Lastly, the National Park Service fails to present what the fighting on and around 
Cemetery Hill meant for the thousands of German-Americans that were involved in the combat. 
The stigma surrounding German-American soldiers in the Union army, especially after the 
humiliating defeat at Chancellorsville is a theme that is often not realized by the casual visitor. 
No monument stands in dedication to the hundreds of German-Americans who fell as casualties 
on the first day of Gettysburg. By failing to acknowledge how the first day’s fighting perpetuated 
the cowardly stereotype surrounding German-American troops, the Park Service is further 
contributing to a narrative of Union moral purity and preventing visitors to come to terms with a 
rather ugly undertone to life in the Union army.   
 The first “big question” one should ask themselves when visiting Cemetery Hill is how 
the commemorative landscape ignores the cultural significance that the fighting on the first day 
had on the German-Americans of the Eleventh Corps. Historian Christian Keller explains that 
“the battle of Gettysburg and the Civil War as a whole enhanced Pennsylvania Germans’ 
conceptions of ethnic identity….German-Americans, especially, emerged from the conflict more 
aware of their ethnicity and how they differed from the greater Anglo-American population.”5 In 
light of Keller’s insight into the significance that fighting at Gettysburg had on German-
                                               
5 Keller, 193. 
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Americans, visitors must ask themselves why there are no monuments nor waysides 
commemorating the sacrifices that thousands of German-Americans made for the Union cause.  
 The second question that visitors should ask themselves is how the preservation of a 
serene and pastoral landscape around Cemetery Hill shifts visitors’ attention away from the 
dehumanizing carnage that Civil War combat brought to the men who fought it. In his book 
Interpreting Sacred Ground, historian Christian Spielvogel explains that maintaining a lush 
natural landscape “creates a pastoral memory of the war that discourages reflection about the 
intrusion of modernization and its effects on shattering ‘courage’s war’ as a masculine ideology 
and military strategy.”6 Using Spielvogel’s analysis as a guide, visitors should ask themselves 
how the monuments at the site of the fighting impose a macro-history perspective on the 
landscape by emphasizing strategic decisions by generals over the confused, chaotic terror that 
individual soldiers were experiencing in the valley below.  
 There are several  monuments on the Cemetery Hill landscape that do in fact honor the 
soldiers who fought rather than the generals commanding from above. When viewing these 
monuments, guests should analyze how the structures emphasize the the legitimization of 
manliness and patriotism by glorifying virtuous suffering and displaying courage in the face of 
dehumanizing combat. In his landmark work Embattled Courage, Gerald Linderman explains 
that “the primacy of courage promised the soldier that no matter how immense the war, how 
distant the fumbling the directing generals, or how powerful enemy forces seeking his 
destruction, his fate would continue to rest on his inner qualities.”7 Juxtaposing Linderman’s 
analysis next to the portrayal of Union citizen soldiers on the monuments, guests must think 
                                               
6J. Christian Spielvogel, Interpreting Sacred Ground: The Rhetoric of National Civil War Parks and Battlefields 
(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2013), 113.  
7 Gerald F. Linderman, Embattled Courage: The Experience of Combat in the American Civil War (New York: The 
Free Press, 1987), 61.  
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about how a monuments’ depiction of Union soldiers fighting and dying in pursuit of duty, 
courage, and manliness distracts visitors from understanding that Civil War combat was chaotic 
and random, with no method or reason as to whom would be torn apart by enemy bullets in fields 
of smoke.  
 There are several themes surrounding the Cemetery Hill landscape that should guide a 
visitor’s interpretation of the area. The first theme centers around the disconnect between the 
Northern public’s perception of why Union soldiers fought and died on the battlefield and the 
actual reasons why many of German-Americans took up arms to defend the country that had 
stigmatized them so frequently. This avoidance of the full truth of the Eleventh Corps’ 
experience both at Gettysburg and during the entire war is explained by post-war Northern 
narratives that desired to portray the Union army as one that held a moral high ground over a 
Southern slave oligarchy.8 By claiming that all soldiers in the Union army were morally virtuous, 
tolerant, and fought for the same reasons, the narrative ignores a narrative surrounding the 
Eleventh Corps that makes the unit so unique. For many of the German-Americans who fought 
and died in the fields around Cemetery Hill, their service was not an effort to preserve the Union, 
but rather a cultural necessity to quell the negative stereotypes surrounding the German 
population in America and legitimize their patriotism through sacrifice on the battlefield.9  
 A second theme embodied within the commemorative landscape has to do with nativism, 
and how Northern xenophobia towards German-Americans is reflected upon the landscape. More 
specifically, an analysis of the various monuments on the landscape can help visitors understand 
how specifically German-American prejudice was used to justify the failures of men like Francis 
Barlow on the battlefield. By stereotyping German-American soldiers as cowardly and 
                                               
8 Gary W. Gallagher, The Union War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 156.  
9 Keller, 21. 
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incompetent soldiers and using them as a scapegoat for the some of the strategic failures on the 
first day, prejudiced Northerners such as Barlow could advance their own narratives of personal 
fulfilment of duty and courage, using the cowardly reputation of the Eleventh Corps’ Germans to 
shift blame away from his leadership and onto an entire culture of people.  
 A third broad theme related to the Cemetery Hill battlefield is the emphasis that the 
National Park Service places on a macro-historical perspective. This perspective shifts a visitor's’ 
focus away from the chaotic hell that individual soldiers experienced on the battlefield, focussing 
instead on the strategic decisions of horse-mounted generals who sat far from the fighting. This 
again distracts visitors from the “savage” interpretation of battle that Christian Spielvogel 
explains, focussing rather on a broader perspective that views units comprised of thousands of 
individuals as one, homogeneous group who all experienced combat in the exact same way.10  
 The first stop on the tour of Cemetery Hill is the Francis Barlow monument, located at 
Barlow’s Knoll. The monument portrays Barlow as a dashing leader who stands unflappably 
facing the advancing Confederates to the North. Left with only a large monument 
commemorating a dashing commander, the Barlow monument leads visitors to believe that he 
was an able and flawless general who bravely defended the knoll that became his namesake. At 
the dedication of the monument in 1922, Colonel Lewis Stegman proudly asserted that “Barlow, 
with characteristic vision, quickly realized that a knob in his front offered an invaluable salient 
for his two brigades and with characteristic daring he did not hesitate in trying to seize it.”11 
Combined with the lush pastoral setting of the knoll, the site of the monument portrays Barlow 
as a wise and strategic commander whose defeat on the first day of fighting could never be in 
vain.  
                                               
10 Spielvogel, 108. 
11 The New York Monuments Commission, In Memoriam: Francis Channing Barlow, 1834-1896 (Albany: J.B. 
Lyon Company, 1923), 29.  
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 While Barlow is immortalized as a man of duty and courage, the absence of any 
acknowledgement to German-American troops around Barlow’s Knoll allows visitors to ignore 
both the sacrifices that the Germans in Barlow’s division made on July 1st, nor the cultural 
struggle that these Germans had to fight against their prejudiced commander. The 
commemorative landscape fails to mention anywhere that Barlow used his German troops as an 
excuse for the defeat at Barlow’s Knoll. In a post-war letter written to one of his classmates, 
Barlow wrote that “these Dutch won’t fight. Their officers say so and they say so themselves and 
they ruin all with whom they come in contact.”12 The commemorative landscape around the 
Barlow monument makes no mention regarding Barlow’s prejudiced comments about German-
Americans, nor admits that his decision to advance forward onto the knoll likely spurred the 
collapse of the Union position. By refusing to discuss the tension between Barlow and his troops, 
the National Park Service is ensuring that Barlow is remembered the same way as every other 
Union soldier would be: as an honorable and morally sound citizen soldier, who made great 
sacrifices for the sake of freedom and equality.  
The landscape around Barlow’s Knoll fails to mention its role as a setting where German-
American troops sought to legitimize their status as Americans in the face of an outspoken and 
prejudiced commander. Christian Keller explains that “immigrants recognized that participation 
in the war was their route to full recognition as American citizens.”13 As a result, Barlow’s Knoll 
would be a key location where hundreds of Germans would take up arms and fight in 
horrendous, dehumanizing combat in order to prove their worth as Americans to prejudiced men 
like Barlow. By maintaining only one historical narrative at the site, that of Barlow courageously 
commanding his troops in battle, the visitor will never realize that Barlow’s Knoll was a setting 
                                               
12 Francis Barlow, letter to Robert Treat Paine, August 12th, 1863.  
13 Keller, 21.  
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in which German-Americans were tasked with fighting their own separate war: that against their 
own Union comrades who labeled them as cowards.  
The decision to exclude the German-American narrative from Barlow’s Knoll can be 
attributed to the postwar North’s efforts to materialize the memory of the Union war effort into a 
single cohesive narrative: that of valiant citizen soldiers who took up arms to fight for equality 
and reunion.14 Thus, shedding light on the fierce stigma that many German-American troops 
faced during the war would prove the Union army to be a hypocritical mass of xenophobes who 
were forcing their comrades to legitimize themselves through bloodshed. In order to keep the 
morally straight, citizen-soldier narrative intact, commemoration efforts established a collective 
memory about the identity of the Union soldier, thus ignoring the prejudice that German-
Americans faced from their own comrades. 
The second stop on the tour brings the visitor to the 74th Pennsylvania monument. The 
monument features a Union soldier who appears to be wounded. He is laying on the ground, with 
an American flag draped over his shoulder and a wreath, a symbol frequently associated with 
victory, at his side. The intent of the monument is to portray a typical Union citizen soldier who 
has been wounded in battle in an attempt to defend his country and achieve victory, the symbols 
for which are kept closely at his side.  
The 74th Pennsylvania monument is a commemorative tool that celebrates citizen 
soldiers of the Union dying the “Good Death” that Victorian America placed so much 
importance upon.15 The 74th Pennsylvania monument portrays Union soldiers as ordinary 
citizens, whose love for their country and desire for victory drove them to make the ultimate 
sacrifice in battle. Additionally, by including the symbols of the wreath and American flag in the 
                                               
14 Gallagher, 157. 
15 Drew Gilpin Faust, Republic of Suffering: Death and the American Civil War (New York: Vintage Books, 2009), 
6.  
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monument, visitors are deceived in believing that the main goal of combat in the Civil War was 
to achieve glory or strategic gain, when in reality war’s goal is always to simply kill as many of 
the enemy as you can. Christian Spielvogel explains that monuments such as that of the 74th 
Pennsylvania are used to “deemphasize the centrality of war’s killing and injuring,” and thus 
shift the visitor’s focus away from the “savage” interpretation of war and instead celebrate these 
soldier’s fulfilment of courage and honor.16 What the monument of the 74th Pennsylvania 
doesn’t explain is how the unit was one of the few all-German regiments in the Union army. 
Thus, similar to the Barlow’s Knoll site, visitors are deceived into believing that the men in the 
74th Pennsylvania were dying out of love for their country and not in an attempt to prove their 
worth as Americans.  
The base of Cemetery Hill is the third stop on the tour. Originally the site of amazing 
bloodshed and confused retreat, the base of the hill today is a serene and pastoral landscape, 
featuring much of the same terrain that the men of the Eleventh Corps fought on. In preserving 
the base of the hill as a pleasant and natural setting, the Park Service is succeeding in evoking a 
feeling among visitors that “effaces war’s savagery and uses nature to protect and promote a 
heroic interpretation of war as part of the natural order.”17 Regimental memoirs written after the 
war prove that the fighting at the base of Cemetery Hill was far from being simply “natural 
order”. Private Reuben Ruch of the 153rd New York described the scene of the fighting’s brutal 
aftermath, claiming that bodies “were piled up in every shape, some on their backs, some on 
their faces, and other turned and twisted in every imaginable shape.”18  
                                               
16 Spielvogel, 104-5.  
17 Ibid, 113.  
18 William R, Kiefer, History of the One Hundred Fifty-third Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry (Easton, 
Pa, 1909), 214.  
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In preserving the pastoral nature of the base of Cemetery Hill, the National Park Service 
is succeeding in creating what Spielvogel describes as a “pastoral memory of the war that 
discourages reflection about the intrusion of modernization and its effects on shattering 
‘courage’s war’ as a masculine ideology and military strategy.”19 Thus, the National Park 
Service is distracting visitors from coming to the realization that the Civil War was a modern, 
brutal war; one that pitted man against machine. There are no waysides in the area to help 
visitors come to grips with the bloodshed that occurred in the valley in front of them. Instead, 
visitors are left to picture what the battle may have looked at in their own way. Consequently, the 
base of Cemetery Hill encourages visitors to ignore what modern technology had done to the 
men of the Eleventh Corps on July 1st, allowing guests to remain under the impression that the 
men in the valley in front of them had died virtuously and peacefully, rather than torn to shreds 
by musket and cannon ball.  
The final stop on the Cemetery Hill tour is the summit of the hill itself, where a massive 
statue of General Oliver Howard overlooks the valley below. At the summit, there are only two 
waysides which just briefly describe some of the fighting on the hill on July 2nd and 3rd, with no 
mention made to the carnage on the 1st. Similar to the pastoral interpretation of the landscape 
which was fostered at the base of the hill, the vast expanse of the valley below further 
depersonalizes the experiences of individual soldiers, instead clumping groups of thousands of 
men into regiments, brigades and divisions. Spielvogel says that this method of landscaping 
succeeds in “directing the visitor’s gaze outward over long stretches of the battlefield in order to 
understand broader battle strategy and outcome.”20 The summit of Cemetery Hill is an attractive 
location for visitors to come to, since its serene views and absence of any Confederate 
                                               
19 Spielvogel, 113.  
20 Spielvogel, 113.  
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monuments allow the visitor observe the battlefield in nostalgic peace, rather than pulling their 
attention towards the realities of bloodshed, retreat, and xenophobic stigma that all interplayed 
within the valley below. The broad projection of the valley that allows visitors to visualize Union 
soldiers as massive units rather than individuals further rejects the depersonalizing horrors of 
combat, and convincing visitors that the ultimate goal of the combat in the valley was something 
more than simply killing as many of the enemy as possible.  
Historical narratives are never simple stories to tell, and the many layers of historical 
narration that reveal, or shield themselves, throughout the Cemetery Hill landscape are an 
excellent reflection of this. It is an unreasonable opinion to think that the National Park Service 
should have to tell every possible narrative at every possible location on the battlefield. It is 
reasonable, however, to task visitors to the battlefield with thinking about why certain details of 
the battle are included while others are ignored. By asking the “big questions” regarding the 
events that transpired at Gettysburg, visitors to the battlefield learn to never take any 
commemorative landscape at the field at face value. If guests can learn anything about the nature 
of a commemorative landscape, it should be that every monument, wayside, and marker is 
located where it is, and says what it says, for a reason. Asking the bigger questions about the 
battle while visiting a commemorative landscape can allow guests to better understand the 
political and cultural factors that influence the memorialization and content of a place like 
Gettysburg National Military Park.  
 
 
 
 
Klustner 15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bibliography 
Coddington, Edwin B., The Gettysburg Campaign, A Study in Command. New York: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1984. 
 
Faust, Drew Gilpin, Republic of Suffering: Death and the American Civil War. New York: 
Vintage Books, 2009.  
 
Francis Barlow, letter to Robert Treat Paine, August 12th, 1863.  
 
Gallagher, Gary W., The Union War, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011. 
 
Keller, Christian, and David L. Valuska, Damn Dutch: Pennsylvania Germans at Gettysburg, 
Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2004. 
 
Kiefer, William R., History of the One Hundred Fifty-third Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry. 
Easton, Pa, 1909. 
 
Linderman, Gerald F., Embattled Courage: The Experience of Combat in the American Civil 
War. New York: The Free Press, 1987. 
 
The New York Monuments Commission, In Memoriam: Francis Channing Barlow, 1834-1896. 
Albany: J.B. Lyon Company, 1923. 
 
Pfanz, Harry W., Gettysburg: Culp’s Hill & Cemetery Hill. Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1993. 
 
Sears, Stephen W., Gettysburg. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2003. 
 
Spielvogel, J. Christian, Interpreting Sacred Ground: The Rhetoric of National Civil War Parks 
and Battlefields. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2013. 
Klustner 16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
